November 13, 2002

By A.C. Thompson

ONE OF THE nation's top bioweapons experts teaches microbiology at UC Davis. His name is Mark Wheelis, and he has published several research papers on the history of germ warfare in prestigious scientific journals, with titles like "Biological Sabotage in World War I" and "Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa."

Lately, Wheelis has been looking at more modern biological munitions – and he's worried. Real worried. The United States, the scientist says, "maintains a classified bioweapons program that violates parts of the convention on biological weapons," referring to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, an international ban on germ warfare.

It's a hypothesis Wheelis argues in a new paper coauthored with Malcolm Dando, of Britain's University of Bradford, and slated for publication in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

In making their case, the authors point to a number of possibly illegal research projects, including a scheme by the Defense Intelligence Agency – the Defense Department's intelligence-gathering arm – to manufacture genetically engineered anthrax and a Central Intelligence Agency project to build a cluster bomb that would release bacterial agents.

They also note the Bush administration's decision in July 2001 to back out of negotiations to create a new bioweapons inspection program. The program had the support of 50 countries; its demise leaves the world without a system to ensure weapons of mass destruction aren't being covertly fabricated. "Perhaps the U.S. rejected the [inspection program] not just because it currently has secret, offensively-oriented 'biodefense' programs, but because it is committed to continuing and expanding them," Wheelis and Dando write.

The ongoing clandestine efforts of the United States and other countries – coupled with the lack of inspections – is likely to fuel a new germ arms race, Wheelis told us. "The result of everybody doing this classified research is a decrease in global security. Suspicions are bound to arise."

Interestingly, Wheelis's own school has scary research in the works.

In conjunction with three state and federal agencies, UC Davis is planning a $190 million facility dubbed the Western National Center for Biodefense and Emerging Diseases. The Sunshine Project, an Austin, Texas-based group that monitors bioweapons, recently obtained and released to the public a detailed 37-page proposal for the center.

According to the proposal, the center would house a biosafety level-four laboratory (i.e., a facility designed to contain the most menacing microbes known to science). Ebola, the ghastly African virus known as the "slate wiper," and botulinum toxin, a hyperlethal agent, are among the bugs that would be kept at the center. Don't worry, though: the proposal cheerily informs us that "Biosafety will be 'job 1.' "

There's another interesting note in the proposal. That's where the planners talk about cooking up drug-resistant pathogens. Under the headline "Need to Work with Genetically Modified Microbial Pathogens," they write, "It is recognized that the threat posed by conventional infectious agents is extended by the threat posed by genetically modified pathogenic agents (e.g., antibiotic-resistant microorganisms.)" In other words, the bad guys are making killer bugs, so we will, too.

Closer to San Francisco, officials at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory also intend to open a new biodefense facility, which will be dedicated to saving lives "in the event of a chemical or biological attack." The facility, according to an environmental assessment report obtained by the Bay Guardian, would handle "bioagents with the potential for aerosol transmission that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease by inhalation."

These deadly specimens – including anthrax – will be shipped to the lab "by commercial package delivery services" and the "U.S. Postal Service," according to the environmental assessment. Mail carriers: Don't say we didn't warn you.

Inga Olson, program director for Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment, an arms control group that monitors the lab, is dubious. "The process for dveloping a vaccine for a bioagent is very similar to the process for developing the actual weapon," she says. "It's a 'dual use' situation."